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ON THE EDGE: BLACKS AND HISPANICS IN
METROPOLITAN MIAMI SINCE 1959
by R AYMOND A. M OHL

N Monday, January 16, 1989, hundreds of blacks in
Miami took to the streets in angry rage for the fourth time
in the 1980s. Over several days, they burned cars and buildings,
looted stores, pelted passers-by with rocks and bottles, and faced
off with riot police in Overtown and Liberty City, Miami’s two
major black communities. The incident that touched off this
new expression of black anger was sadly familiar. A Miami
policeman had shot and killed a black man fleeing a traffic infraction on a motorcycle, while a second black man, a passenger
on the motorcycle, was thrown from the vehicle and also killed.
It was difficult to miss the irony in the fact that this latest Miami
riot took place on the same day that blacks had celebrated the
birthday of Martin Luther King, Jr., the modern apostle of nonviolence. There were other ironies, as well. In this new immigrant city, it should not have been surprising that none of those
involved in the riot-triggering incident was a native-born American. The police officer who fired the fatal bullet, William
Lozano, had immigrated to Miami with his family from Colombia. Although few noticed at the time, the two dead black men,
Allen Blanchard and Clement Lloyd, were also migrants from
the Carribean basin, from the U. S. Virgin Islands. The three
newcomers whose paths crossed on that fateful Monday evening
had come to south Florida in search of the elusive American
dream; what they found in Miami, ultimately, was something
quite different.1
Raymond A. Mohl is professor of history and chairman of the department,
Florida Atlantic University, and editor of Searching for the Sunbelt: Historical
Perspectives on a Region (University of Tennessee Press, 1990).
1. Miami Herald, January 17, 18, 19, 22, December 10, 1989; Miami Times,
January 19, 26, 1989; New York Times, January 18, 22, 1989; Los Angeles
Times, January 17, 19, 20, 1989; Jacob V. Lamar, “A Brightly Colored
Tinderbox,” Time (January 30, 1989), 28-29; George Hackett, “‘All of Us
Are in Trouble,“’ Newsweek (January 30, 1989), 36-37.
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One can also find symbolic contradiction in the fact that the
January 1989 riot in Miami came at the very time that this city
of Cuban exiles was on the receiving end of a new mass immigration of Latin newcomers, this time from Nicaragua. Nicaraguan
exiles began concentrating in Miami following the 1979 overthrow of the Somoza regime by the Sandinista revolutionaries.
Politically comfortable with the right-wing, anticommunist Cubans, Anastasio Somoza set up an exile headquarters in the city,
and many thousands of his countrymen followed over the next
decade. Worsening economic and political conditions in
Nicaragua in 1988 coincided with a loosening of United States
immigration policy toward Central America, resulting in a new
exodus of Nicaraguan exiles who trekked overland through
Honduras, Guatamala, and Mexico to Texas, and then on to
Miami by bus. By December 1988, a month before Miami
exploded into violence, some 200 Nicaraguans were pouring
into Miami every day, and the press was widely predicting that
an estimated 100,000 additional Nicaraguans would arrive in
Miami within the next year. The new Nicaraguan migration
provided the backdrop for the latest violence in Overtown and
Liberty City. It was hard to escape the contradictions: the blacks
were burning down their neighborhoods in despair, but the
thousands of newly arrived Nicaraguan refugees pinned their
hopes for the future on a new life in Miami.2
For observers of the Miami scene, all of this was quite familiar. It had happened before, and more than once. The 1980
Liberty City riots had been touched off by a not guilty verdict
for several Miami policemen, some of whom were Hispanic,

2.

The new Nicaraguan exile migration has been covered extensively. See
Dave Von Drehle, “Nicaraguan Refugees Flock into Miami,” Miami Herald,
January 13, 1989; Liz Balmaseda, “East Little Havana: A New Nicaragua,”
ibid., February 5, 1989; Christopher Marquis, “Nicaraman Exiles Changed
Miami’s Face,” ibid., July 16, 1989. See also Melinda Beck, “Exodus of the
‘Feet People.’“ Newsweek (November 14, 1988), 37; Barry Bearak, “Miami
Reacts with Charity and Anxiety to Latest Refugee Influx from
Nicaragua,” Los Angeles Times, January 17, 1989; Paul Adams, “Next Stop,
Miami.” Fort Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel, Sunshine Magazine (March 5, 1989),
24-30; Brad Edmondson, “In Little Managua,” American Demographics 11
(August 1989), 53-55; and Anne Moncreiff Arrarte, “The Contras and
Miami: How Do You Resettle an Unemployed Army,” South Florida 42
(August 1989), 64-67, 133-34.
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charged with beating a black motorcyclist to death. This riot,
too, coincided with massive Caribbean migrations to Miami: the
1980 Mariel boatlift, which brought 125,000 new Cuban exiles
to south Florida, and the simultaneous migration of upwards of
25,000 Haitian boat people in 1979 and 1980, some of whom
were washing up on south Florida beaches within sight of heavy
palls of smoke from the torched neighborhoods of Liberty City
and Overtown. Two years later, in December 1982, a Hispanic
policeman killed a black youth in an Overtown video-game parlor, setting off another wave of black ghetto rioting.3
There was a tragic sameness to these events. Confrontations
of various sorts between blacks and the police touched off violence each time. These encounters often involved Hispanic
police officers. In two of the riots since 1980, mass migrations
to Miami of Hispanic exiles and other Caribbean refugees occurred simultaneously, providing a poignant backdrop to the
outbursts of violence in the city’s black neighborhoods. As many
observers have suggested, these events reflected much deeper
social, economic, and political tensions between blacks and Hispanics in the Miami metropolitan area.
It is something of an historical accident that the Cuban Revolution and the subsequent exile migration to south Florida
coincided with the civil rights movement in the late 1950s and
1960s. In the Miami area, those two powerful forces for change
not only coincided, but they collided with one another. The
human consequences were enormous and long-lasting. The Cubans arrived— over 800,000 of them between 1959 and 1980—
just as the civil rights movement was opening things up for
long-depressed and long-repressed black communities. As the
old barriers of segregation crumbled throughout the South,
blacks generally found new opportunities in employment, housing, schooling, government, and social services. Blacks also became empowered politically, which eventually led to a dramatic

3.

For an analysis of the 1980 Liberty City riots, see Bruce Porter and Marvin
Dunn, The Miami Riot of 1980: Crossing the Bounds (Lexington, MA, 1984).
On the Mariel boatlift, see Robert L. Bach, “The New Cuban Exodus,”
Caribbean Review 11 (Winter 1982), 22-25, 58-60. On the migration of Haitian boat people, see Alex Stepick, Haitian Refugees in the U.S. (London:
Minority Rights Group, Report No. 52, 1982); and Jake C. Miller, The
Plight of Haitian Refugees (New York, 1984).
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transformation of municipal politics and government as blacks
rose to positions of leadership in the big cities and small towns
of the South.4
But in Miami, things took a somewhat different course. In
retrospect, it appears that the Cuban migration short-circuited
the economic and political gains blacks were making elsewhere.
Moreover, the exile “invasion,” as it was called in the 1960s,
touched off thirty years of competition and conflict between
blacks and Hispanics over jobs, residential space, government
services, and political power in the south Florida area. The widespread perception, supported by reams of economic and
sociological data, that the Cubans have been exceptionally successful in the United States— and that they have, essentially, won
out in the economic and political struggle in Miami— has contributed to a pervasive sense of powerlessness, resentment, and
despair in black Miami. Each successive wave of newcomers in
the 1970s and 1980s— the Haitians, the Nicaraguans, the Mariel
Cubans— generated new expressions of concern for the consequences, and often of outrage and anger, in the black press and
among those who spoke for the black community.
Tension between blacks and Hispanics in Miami was
superimposed on a much longer history of racial conflict that
dates back to Miami’s origin as a city in 1896. Residentially,
blacks were forced into a densely populated, unhealthy
shacktown on the fringes of the business district. As in the rest
of the South at the turn of the century, lynchings were not
uncommon, and police repression in the black community was
routine. The Ku Klux Klan acted with impunity into the 1930s
and even as late as 1951 white night riders dynamited an apartment complex undergoing transition from white to black occupancy. The white primary system, and later other registration
restrictions and voting procedures, such as at-large elections,
effectively excluded blacks from the political process, and the
urban renewal and highway building of the 1950s and 1960s
destroyed large portions of Miami’s black inner-city community.”
4.
5.

For an analysis of the impact of the civil rights movement in the urban
South, see David R. Goldfield, Black, White, and Southern: Race Relations and
Southern Culture 1940 to the Present (Baton Rouge, 1990).
Paul S. George, “Colored Town: Miami’s Black Community, 1896-1930,”
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Race relations had never been very good in Miami before
the civil rights era. Even after voting rights were assured in the
1960s, blacks did not become politically assertive, partially because the city had never developed much of a black middle class
from which to draw leadership. Moreover, a troubled pattern
of community-police relations plagued the city in the years between the two major ghetto riots of 1968 and 1980— a period
during which thirteen “mini-riots” occurred, all stemming from
police confrontations or altercations with blacks. Despite its national image through the 1950s as a glitzy tourist town and vacation spa, Miami was still very much a Deep South city during
the segregation era, with all that that implied for race relations.
As writer Joan Didion recently commented, with wry understatement, Miami “was a city with black people and white people
viewed each other with some discontent.6
Race relations in Miami were complicated in unanticipated
ways by the outcome of the Cuban Revolution in 1959. The
migration of Cuban exiles over thirty years, and of more recent
newcomers from other Latin nations, has brought a veritable
demographic revolution to the Miami metropolitan area. During that period, more than 800,000 Cubans left their homeland
for the United States. Despite federal efforts to relocate the
Cubans throughout the country, a large proportion of them
eventually settled permanently in the Miami area.7

Florida Historical Quarterly 56 (April 1978), 432-47; Paul S. George, “Policing Miami’s Black Community, 1896-1930,” ibid. 57 (April 1979), 434-50;
Raymond A. Mohl, “Trouble in Paradise: Race and Housing in Miami
during the New Deal Era,” Prologue: Journal of the National Archives 19
(Spring 1987), 7-21; Raymond A. Mohl, “Shadows in the Sunshine: Race
and Ethnicity in Miami,” Tequesta: The Journal of the Historical Association of
Southern Florida 49 (1989), 63-80.
6. On the weakness of Miami’s black leadership, see Clyde C. Wooten et al.,
Psycho-Social Dynamics in Miami (Coral Gables, 1969), 372-406. On the
“mini-riots” between 1968 and 1980, see Porter and Dunn, The Miami Riot
of 1980, 17-22. For the Didion comment, see Joan Didion, Miami (New
York, 1987), 39-40.
7. On the Cuban exile migration, see Raymond A. Mohl, “Immigration
through the Port of Miami,” in G. Mark Stolarik, ed., Forgotten Doors: The
Other Ports of Entry to the United States (Philadelphia, 1988), 81-98; and Felix
Roberto Masud-Piloto, With Open Arms: Cuban Migration to the United States
(Totowa, NJ, 1988).
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As a result of the Cuban exile migration, both the city of
Miami and the entire Miami metropolitan area are now generally considered to be “tri-ethnic” in character. In 1950, prior to
the Cuban exodus, Hispanics in the Miami area— mostly Puerto
Ricans— totaled about 20,000, or 4 percent of the population.
By the late 1980s however, some 900,000 Hispanics resided in
the Miami area, and they made up almost one-half of the metropolitan population, and over 65 percent of the population of
the city of Miami. Once the 1990 census is completed, these
demographic statistics will almost certainly be revised upward
still again. By contrast, the percentage of blacks in the Miami
area has remained relatively stable over many decades, ranging
from 18 percent in 1940 to 17 percent in 1980.8
The dramatic outpouring of newcomers from Cuba and
other Latin nations of the Caribbean basin has had an enormous
impact on the economic, political, and cultural life of the Miami
area. For Miami’s blacks, who had long been on the bottom
rungs of the economic ladder and politically powerless, the
Cuban migration posed special problems. It did not take long
for Miami’s black press and community leaders to recognize
that the Cuban newcomers would be competing with blacks for
jobs and housing.
Although often penniless on arrival in Miami, the earliest
Cuban exiles had education, skills, and a strong work ethic. An
entire professional and business class literally was uprooted
from Havana and set down in Miami. Because the Cubans initially lacked capital, English language skills, and the appropriate
credentials to practice their professions in the United States,
they moved at first into the low-paying service-type jobs traditionally held by blacks, particularly in tourist hotels and restaurants in Miami and Miami Beach. They also found work in
downtown retail, office, and service jobs; in the expanding local

8.

On Miami’s changing demography, see William W. Jenna, Metropolitan
Miami: A Demographic Overview (Coral Gables, 1972); Raymond A. Mohl,
“Miami: The Ethnic Cauldron,” in Richard M. Bernard and Bradley R.
Rice, eds., Sunbelt Cities: Politics and Growth since World War II (Austin, TX,
1983), 67-72; Oliver Kerr, Population Projections: Race and Hispanic Origin,
Dade County, Florida, 1980-2000 (Miami, 1987); Oliver Kerr, Population Projections: Patterns of Population Change, Dade County, Florida, 1970-2010
(Miami, 1987).
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garment industry; in construction; and in other blue-collar employment where they competed with black workers. The stories
are legendary of Cuban bankers working as janitors, Cuban accountants washing dishes in greasy-spoon restaurants, and
Cuban doctors emptying hospital bedpans. As early as 1959,
complaints from blacks and organized labor began to be heard,
contending that the Cubans were taking the jobs of American
citizens and undermining prevailing local wage levels.9
By 1963, when over 200,000 Cuban exiles had arrived, discussion of Cuban economic competition with Miami blacks had
become commonplace. In June of that year, Ebony magazine
published an extensive article on what was already being labeled
the “Cuban invasion” of south Florida. The Cubans had injected
new life and “Latin ways” into the city, the Ebony piece conceded,
but they “also brought in the wake of their invasion a host of
grave social and economic problems.” In particular, the article
pointed to the emerging competition between blacks and Cubans over jobs, housing, schooling, and government services— a
sort of zero-sum analysis in which a limited supply of resources
was now being divided among a larger number of competing
groups. “The economic penetration of the refugees is now universal,” Ebony sadly concluded. Similarly, beginning in the early
1960s the Miami Times, the city’s black weekly newspaper, regularly lamented the negative economic impact of the Cuban influx. “The Cubans are slowly taking over the business of Dade
County,” the Miami Times typically complained in 1966.10
Initially, the zero-sum analysis was rejected by officialdom in
Miami. City and federal officials introduced businessmen,
economists, and experts willing to argue that few blacks had
been displaced by the new Cuban arrivals. By the mid 1960s
however, the evidence seemed to be building that job displacement had indeed been taking place. It was clear that the employ9.

10.

Cal Brumley, “Cuban Exodus,” Wall Street Journal, November 28, 1960;
Neil Maxwell, “Unwelcome Guests,” ibid., May 6, 1963; Neil Maxwell,
“New Influx of Cubans Faces Cool Reception from Many Miamians,” ibid.,
October 12, 1965; New York Times, October 21, 1961, October 17, 1965;
Tom Alexander, “Those Amazing Cuban Refugees,” Fortunes 74 (October
1966), 144-49; Edward J. Linehan, “Cuba’s Exiles Bring New Life to
Miami,“ National Geographic 144 (July 1973), 63-95.
Allan Morrison, “Miami’s Cuban Refugee Crisis,” Ebony 18 (June 1963),
96-104; Miami Times, July 15, 1966.
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ment gains blacks had been making elsewhere in the civil rights
era had yet to materialize in Miami. By 1965, the city’s Community Relations Board had taken up the issue at a time when it
was feared that the economic competition between the two
groups would spill over into violent conflict. Ironically, in view
of Miami’s later racial history, it was reported by the Wall Street
Journal in 1965 that the city was taking “pride” in the fact that
there had “never been a major race clash here.” Racial violence
held off until 1968 when the city exploded during the Republican national convention in Miami Beach. Cuban economic competition and governmental favoritism for the newcomers found
a place among the official explanations for the 1968 Miami riot,
as well as for later racial explosions. As one journalist noted in
a New York Times article in 1974, “The role of the Cubans in the
Miami job market of the early sixties contributed to a legacy of
racial tension that hangs over black-Cuban relations today.“11
During the 1970s and 1980s as earlier Cubans moved upward economically and professionally, newer exiles from Cuba
and elsewhere took their places in Miami’s low-wage service and
manufacturing economy. By the 1980s, for instance, according
to the 1982 Miami report of the United States Civil Rights Commission, Hispanics made up two-thirds of Miami’s construction
labor force, and 85 percent of the workers in Miami’s extensive
garment industry. By contrast, despite the area’s growing economy, blacks have remained on the economic margins, with high
proportions of poverty-level incomes, high levels of unemployment, and little economic opportunity. Over time, Hispanics replaced blacks in the service economy where they had formerly
predominated. In the hotel industry, for example, a survey of
twelve major hotels in 1981 revealed that blacks held only 9.9
percent of almost 4,300 hotel jobs. “By all social indicators,” the
Civil Rights Commission reported, “blacks have been excluded
from the economic mainstream in Miami.” Despite the gains of
the civil rights era, the commission contended, “generations of

11.

Wall Street Journal, May 6, 1963, October 12, 1965; Susan Jacoby, “Miami
si, Cuba no,” New York Times Magazine (September 29, 1974), 104. For an
analysis of the 1968 Miami riot, see National Commission on the Causes
and Prevention of Violence, Miami Report: The Report of the Miami Study
Team on Civil Disturbances in Miami, Florida, during the Week of August 5, 1968
(Washington, DC, 1969).
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explicit and race-based employment discrimination have left a
legacy that continues to infect the labor market.“12
Not only did the Cubans move into the local job market, but
their collective entrepreneurialism soon had a dramatic impact
on business activity in the Miami metropolitan area. By 1972,
when the Hispanic population of the area was about double that
of blacks, Hispanics had established more than three times as
many businesses as blacks, and gross receipts surpassed those of
black businesses by five times. Moreover, black businesses were
overwhelmingly small; they were concentrated in selective services and the retail trade, they lacked access to capital, and they
employed few salaried workers beyond the business-owner himself. Things had hardly improved by 1982 when only 1 percent
of Miami’s businesses were black-owned, and almost all of
them— 88 percent— were owner-operated with no employees.13
This pattern of energetic Hispanic business activity continued through the 1970s and into the 1980s. It is now clear that
the Cuban exiles created a self-sufficient “enclave economy,”
one entirely separate from the mainstream white business community, and separate as well from the peripheral black minority
economy. Some observers contend that the Cuban enclave economy has not undermined the economic standing of Miami
blacks, since the Cubans carved out completely new business
opportunities in ethnic goods and foods, cigar making, and international trade. Thus, say sociologists Kenneth L. Wilson and
W. Allen Martin, the Cubans’ extraordinary entrepreneurial
success did not come at the expense of the black community.14

12.

13.

14.

U. S. Commission on Civil Rights, Confronting Racial Isolation in Miami
(Washington, DC, 1982), 1-26, 124-90, quotations on pp. 18 and 124. See
also Harold M. Rose, “Blacks and Cubans in Metropolitan Miami’s Changing Economy,” Urban Geography 10 (1989), 464-86.
Minority-Owned Businesses, Miami Florida (Miami, 1975), 1-4, 15; George J.
Demas and Richard J. Welsh, Profile of Black-Owned Businesses, Dade County,
Florida, 1982 (Miami, 1986); Andrew Neil, “America’s Latin Beat: A Survey
of South Florida,” The Economist 285 (October 16, 1982), 21. For the contrast with Hispanic businesses, see Richard J. Welsh and Panos Efstathiou,
Profile of Hispanic Businesses, Dade County, Florida, 1982 (Miami, 1986).
Kenneth L. Wilson and W. Allen Martin, “Ethnic Enclaves: A Comparison
of the Cuban and Black Economies in Miami,” American Journal of Sociology
88 (July 1982), 135-60. Additional insight into the Cuban enclave economy
can be found in Jan B. Luytjes, Economic Impact of Refugees in Dade County
(Miami, 1982); Antonio Jorge and Raul Moncarz, The Political Economy of
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However, considerable evidence also suggests that, at least
in some degree, Cuban entrepreneurial success did undercut
black-owned businesses. For example, blacks owned 25 percent
of all the gas stations in Dade County in 1960. By 1979, black
ownership of service stations had dropped to 9 percent, but
Hispanic stations numbered 48 percent of the total. Similarly,
differential patterns can be found in the Miami activities of the
Small Business Administration (SBA). Between 1968 and 1979,
the SBA distributed about $100,000,000 to Miami area businesses. Hispanics received 47 percent of the total over the twelveyear period; non-Hispanic whites, 46.5 percent; and blacks, 6.4
percent. In the year after the 1980 Liberty City riot, 90 percent
of SBA loans in Miami went to Hispanics and whites. The Cuban
enclave economy has absorbed hundreds of thousands of Hispanic newcomers over the years, but has done little to advance
the economic position of Miami’s blacks. As writer David Rieff
put it, “The blacks were frozen out” by the Cubans, who “saw
no particular reason to have to assume the burden of America’s
historical obligation to black people.“15
Clearly, the Cubans exiles have fared well in the United
States. Numerous studies have demonstrated the rapid upward
socioeconomic mobility of the early waves of Cuban immigrants.
Despite the leveling tendency of their emigration over time,
statistical evidence from the Census Bureau reveals that the Cubans have more education, better jobs, and higher incomes than
the Hispanic population generally in the United States. The
economic success of the Cubans, without any comparable improvement for blacks, has been a persistent source of irritation
and resentment in the Miami black community. In particular,
blacks generally feel left out of the local job market, since, as
one observer noted, “Miami blacks always live in danger of losing their jobs to the latest wave of immigrants off the islands
Cubans in South Florida (Coral Gables, 1987); Kenneth L. Wilson and
Alejandro Portes, “Immigrant Enclaves: An Analysis of the Labor Market
Experience of Cubans in Miami,” American Journal of Sociology 86 (September 1980), 295-319; Alejandro Portes, “The Social Origins of the
Cuban Enclave Economy of Miami,” Sociological Perspectives 30 (1987), 34072.
15. Miami Herald, May 17, 1981; Porter and Dunn, The Miami Riot of 1980,
68-69; David Rieff, Going to Miami: Exiles, Tourists, and Refugees in the New
America (Boston, 1987), 172, 174; Rose, “Blacks and Cubans,” 477-84.
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prepared to work for peanuts.” As the Civil Rights Commission
put it in 1982, blacks were “the missing partner” in Miami’s
dramatic economic growth of the past several decades. This
same theme was echoed six years later, in 1988, when Newsweek
noted that “the black community has been left out of Dade
County’s prosperity almost entirely.“16
The Cuban influx also created a new level of competition for
housing and residential space in the Miami area. Miami had
always had a highly segregated residential pattern. Several
sociological studies, for example, noted that of more than one
hundred large American cities, Miami had the highest degree
of residential segregation by race in 1940, 1950, and 1960— before the Cuban influx— a legacy of the racial zoning of the segregation era. By 1970, Miami’s “index of residential segregation”
had improved somewhat compared to other southern cities, but
92 percent of Miami blacks still lived in segregated neighborhoods. In 1980, after thirty years of civil rights activism in urban
America, Miami still ranked near the top of a list of sixty metropolitan areas in the extent of black residential segregation.17
At the time of the initial Cuban migrations, most Miami
blacks lived in Liberty City and Overtown, two large ghettoized
communities north and west of the central business district,
while others resided in half a dozen smaller black neighborhoods scattered throughout the metropolitan area. The urban
renewal and interstate highway construction of the 1950s and
1960s, and continued downtown redevelopment activities in the
1970s and 1980s, resulted in the destruction of at least 10,000

16.

17.

Neil, “America’s Latin Beat,” 21-22; Civil Rights Commission, Confronting
Racial Isolation in Miami, 79-123; Tom Morganthau, “Miami,” Newsweek
(January 25, 1988), 29. On the demographic evidence for Cuban success,
see A. J. Jaffe et al., The Changing Demography of Spanish Americans (New
York, 1980), 245-78; and Frank D. Bean and Marta Tienda, The Hispanic
Population of the United States (New York, 1988).
Donald O. Cowgill, “Trends in Residential Segregation of Non-Whites in
American Cities,” American Sociological Review 21 (February 1956), 43-47;
Karl E. Taeuber and Alma F. Taeuber, Negroes in Cities: Residential Segregation and Neighborhood Change (Chicago, 1965), 39-41; Annemette Sorenson
et al., “Indexes of Racial Residential Segregation for 109 Cities in the
United States, 1940-1970,” Sociological Focus 8 (1975), 125-42; Douglas S.
Massey and Nancy A. Denton, “Trends in the Residential Segregation of
Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians: 1970-1980,” American Sociological Review 52
(December 1987), 802-25; Miami Herald, December 30, 1987.

Published by STARS, 1990

11

Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 69 [1990], No. 1, Art. 4
48

FLORIDA HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

housing units, mostly in the black, inner-city community of
Overtown. At the same time, the Cubans were arriving in massive numbers and staking out their own inner-city residential
space west of the central business district, in what is now known
as Little Havana, and also in Hialeah in the far northwest quadrant of the metropolitan area.18
Blacks displaced from Overtown by urban renewal and redevelopment found their relocation choices limited. Consequently,
existing black communities such as Liberty City grew in population, pushing out the frontiers of the ghetto into adjoining
white, working-class districts such as Opa-Locka and Carol City.
As one social scientist noted in a 1979 study, “the Latin American community of Miami has grown so rapidly in population
that it has dramatically affected the residential space of other
groups within the city.” Urban renewal and the Cuban influx,
taken together, limited the number of housing units available to
blacks, the Civil Rights Commission reported in the wake of the
1980 Liberty City riots. The conjunction of redevelopment and
immigration, in the 1960s especially, contributed to excessive
rents, a high level of overcrowding, a rapidly deteriorating housing stock, and worsening slum conditions in Miami’s black communities. 19
From the early 1960s, Miami blacks were aware of the social
and economic implications of the Cuban influx. Jobs and housing had always been high on the list of black grievances. But the
arrival of the Cubans created a new grievance: governmental
favoritism toward the newcomers. Because the Cubans were escaping communism in Cuba, they were accorded a special

18.
19.

Harold M. Rose, “Metropolitan Miami’s Changing Negro Population,
1950-1960,” Economic Geography 40 (July 1964), 221-38; Mohl, “Shadows in
the Sunshine,” 63-80.
Morton D. Winsberg, “Housing Segregation of a Predominantly Middle
Class Population: Residential Patterns Developed by the Cuban Immigration into Miami, 1950-74,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology 38
(October 1979), 403-18, quotation on p. 415. See also Kerr, Population
Projections: Race and Hispanic Origin; Morton D. Winsberg, “Ethnic Competition for Residential Space in Miami, Florida, 1970-1980,“American Journal
of Economics and Sociology 42 (July 1983), 305-14; B. E. Aguirre et al., “The
Residential Patterning of Latin American and Other Ethnic Populations in
Metropolitan Miami,” Latin American Research Review 15, No. 2 (1980), 3563.
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parolee status outside the regular immigration quota, and then
given special treatment after they arrived. Initially, private voluntary and religious agencies, particularly the Catholic Church,
supplied emergency assistance for the Cuban exiles. But very
quickly, in December 1960, President Eisenhower created the
Cuban Refugee Program (CRP) to handle the actual processing
and resettlement of the Cubans in Miami. After initial security
screening of the exiles by the Immigration and Naturalization
Service, the CRP’s Cuban Refugee Emergency Center in Miami
provided them with food and clothing, housing assistance, social
services, medical care, relocation assistance, educational programs, job training, and job placement. Special programs, costing $130,000,000 in federal funds through 1972, were introduced into the Dade County public schools to aid in the adjustment and training of the newcomers and their children. Language classes, vocational training, business education, varied
adult education programs, and the like proliferated to assist the
Cubans. The University of Miami and other agencies were enlisted to train, “retool,” and recertify Cuban professionals. As a
result, thousands of Cuban physicians, nurses, lawyers, pharmacists, dentists, accountants, architects, engineers, veterinarians,
and teachers were enabled to resume their professional lives in
south Florida. Special federal loans were made available for Cubans wishing to attend universities. The assistance of the Small
Business Administration, mentioned earlier, stimulated business
start-ups among the Cuban exiles. This vast exile welfare program, according to one study, touched directly about 75 percent
of all the Cuban arrivals before 1974. The cost was enormous:
by 1973, more than $1,000,000,000 had been spent by the federal government to assist Cuban resettlement in the United
States. The continuing Cuban migration drove federal expenses
considerably higher by the 1980s. The bill for processing, settling, and detaining the Cubans from the Mariel boatlift, for
example, surpassed $2,000,000,000 by 1990. Reflecting on the
vast federal program for exiles, one Cuban teacher noted simply, “They have helped us a lot.“20
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There was another source of governmental support for
many Cubans in Miami as well. For years, the Central Intelligence Agency had thousands of Miami Cubans on the CIA
payroll, perhaps as many as 12,000 or more at one point in the
early 1960s. Some of these people surfaced during the Watergate break-in in the early 1970s, and others during the more
recent Iran-Contra fiasco. During the 1960s, in fact, the Miami
CIA station was the largest in the world outside of McLean,
Virginia. In the cold war era, the hard-line, anticommunist
Cuban exiles in south Florida found a ready source of financial
and other support in the federal government.21
The vast outpouring of federal funding for the Cuban exiles
had a lot to do with the quick adaptation and economic success
of the newcomers from the Caribbean. Over time, blacks came
to resent the preferential treatment of Cubans by government
at every level. Black community leaders and the black press
often drew comparisons between the rising condition of the
Cuban refugees and the still-downtrodden situation of Miami’s
blacks. This issue of preferential treatment for Hispanic newcomers has persisted into the 1980s and beyond. Moreover, the
perception among blacks that the recent Nicaraguan exiles are
equally favored has kept this issue inflamed. The differential
treatment accorded recent black immigrants from Haiti, who
have been incarcerated in detention camps or forced back to
their homeland, has only served to strengthen the sense of ill
treatment among Miami’s blacks.22
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The black sense of powerlessness in Cuban Miami has been
intensified by changes in the local political culture. Over time,
the Cuban migration dramatically altered the political structure
of the Miami area, especially as the Cubans became citizens and
voters by the mid 1970s. At one time, Florida was an integral
part of the solidly Democratic South. Now, the Cubans have
become a major cog in Florida’s conservative Republican party
23
politics. On the local level, the five-member Miami city commission is dominated in 1990 by three Cubans, including Cubanborn mayor Xavier Suarez. Hialeah, Dade County’s second
largest city, has been controlled politically by the Cubans for
almost a decade. At-large voting has prevented similar gains at
the county level, but proposed charter changes replacing atlarge voting with a district system will ultimately give the Hispanic newcomers control of the Dade County metro commission
as well.24
Although exile concerns have not completely died out, the
Cubans have become adept players at the old urban game of
ethnic politics. Local elections over the past decade have reflected bitter ethnic divisiveness in tri-ethnic Miami. “The
animosity that exists between the three communities runs deep,
real deep,” one political writer observed as early as 1983.

23.
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Moreover, ethnicity pervades most of the important political
issues in the Miami area, and the high degree of residential
segregation not only lends strength to ethnic or racial voting,
but intensifies certain kinds of emotional territorial issues such
as zoning, school busing, or public housing location. As one
recent scholarly analysis put it, “Ethnic conflict in Miami shows
signs of growing brittleness and intransigence in an atmosphere
characterized by group polarization and zero-sum politics.“25
The civil rights movement empowered blacks politically in
other southern cities, but the Cuban influx to south Florida
produced a different outcome. In Atlanta, New Orleans,
Richmond, Birmingham, and other southern cities, black population majorities ultimately brought political power. This has
not happened in Miami where blacks remain a relatively small
minority and where at-large elections have effectively disfranchised black voters. Some black leaders have sought to overcome
this political impotency by creating a new municipality for the
sprawling, unincorporated Liberty City community. Black supporters of the plan view this so-called New City as a means of
acquiring local political power, a community-controlled police
force, and a higher level of services. The metro commission,
which must approve the incorporation of any new municipality,
has vetoed the New City plan numerous times.26
The Cuban influx to metropolitan Miami altered the rules
and the boundaries of the political game. Indeed, the Caribbean
migration ultimately put a whole new team on the field, pushing
the old players off to the sidelines. Black spokesmen have been
alternately dismayed and infuriated by the emerging political
dominance of the Cubans, or “the Cuban Takeover,” as it is
often referred to in the black press. As one black columnist
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bitterly put it in the Miami Times in the wake of the 1989 riots:
“The reality of Miami today and in the foreseeable future, is
that the Cubans are the new masters in Miami. They should not
be surprised when those who feel they have nothing to lose rise
up against the new rulers.“27
It should be clear, then, that ethnic relations in the Miami
area are in considerable disarray. Black resentment has been
festering since the 1960s over the economic success of the Cubans, their dominance of the job and housing markets, their
newly developed political power, and the preferential treatment
they have received from government. Other more immediate
issues such as police harassment and violence, or the perception
of police violence, in the ghetto have produced the racial explosions that have characterized Miami since 1968. But behind
these overt incidents lies thirty years of ethnic competition and
conflict between Miami’s blacks and their new Hispanic neighbors from the Caribbean basin. The persistent failure of the
system to deliver often promised social and economic improvements— better housing, improved schools, job training, better
services— contrasted with the perceived advantages and benefits
received first by the Cubans, and later by the Nicaraguans, has
kept black Miami on the edge of rage and despair.
Objectively, it is clear that there are wide economic disparities within the Cuban community, and that not all Hispanic
immigrants to south Florida have shared in the reality of American economic opportunity. The Mariel boatlift of 1980, in particular, demonstrated that there was a distinct class and even a
racial dimension to Miami’s Cuban community. It is also true
that, despite their vaunted economic success, the Cubans have
yet to break into the upper echelons of the Miami power structure, often dominated by absentee bankers, developers, and corporate executives. Nevertheless, perceptions are important, and
Miami blacks mostly see that Cubans and other Hispanics own
the local businesses they patronize, control access to the local job
market, dominate the local political decision-making process,
limit accessibility and choice in housing, and fill increasing numbers of positions in local government and, significantly, on the
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police force. Blacks also share an uncomfortable sense that the
Hispanic newcomers have become racists. As a black Miami architect, born in Houston, suggested to a reporter recently, “Too
many of the Cubans . . . have adopted a southern mentality.”
As social scientists, we know that objective reality is less important than perception in determining behavior. Image-making
was always important in the glitzy, glamorous tourist spa that
Miami used to be, and it turns out that images and perceptions
of a different kind now prevail in Miami, the new immigrant
city.28
The 1980 Liberty City riot focused new attention on race
relations in Miami. One black scholar contended that “the political economy of racism” made Liberty City and other black
neighborhoods “ripe for rebellion.” However, one early post1980 riot analysis— that by journalist Bruce Porter and social
psychologist Marvin Dunn— pushed the issue of Hispanic competition into the forefront of discussion. Porter and Dunn
sought to explain Miami’s racial explosion, at least partially, as
the result of the Cuban influx into the city. In a 1981 New York
Times article summarizing their research, Porter and Dunn
noted the political and economic powerlessness of blacks in
Miami. But they went on to argue that the Cuban immigration
to Miami prevented blacks from making economic gains just as
the civil rights movement and desegregation were beginning to
eliminate legal barriers. As Porter and Dunn put it, “Just as
blacks were groping out of their forced isolation, in came hundreds of thousands of Cubans and other Hispanic immigrants”
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who displaced blacks in the job market and “shouldered aside
the existing black-owned businesses.” The depressed economic
condition of Miami’s blacks, the report implied, was “the reverse
side of a Hispanic economic boom.“29
The charges that they have been somehow to blame for the
economic condition of Miami’s blacks and for two decades of
ghetto rioting have offended the Hispanic community in south
Florida. “It’s not our fault,” Hispanics have argued, that centuries of slavery, racism, and segregation victimized blacks in
the United States. “The centuries-old structures of racism” account for the economic condition of Miami’s blacks, contended
Cuban-American sociologist Lisandro Pérez, not “Miami’s newly
arrived Hispanic peoples, who are now being scapegoated for
the consequences of those long-standing structures.“30
Pérez has a point, to be sure, and this brings one back to the
chief interpretive argument outlined at the beginning of this
paper; that is, that the conjunction of the Cuban Revolution and
the civil rights movement moved Miami onto an alternative path
in race relations. “The Cuban Revolution,” one writer has noted,
“was as much a pivotal event in Miami’s modern history as it was
in Cuba’s.”31 While other cities, north and south, gradually addressed the issues dividing blacks and whites, Miami was much
more preoccupied with receiving and accommodating the
Cuban exiles, pushing civil rights and social reform issues into
the background. The Cubans and other Hispanics from the
South seized opportunities as they found them, and then
created new opportunities for themselves in an amenable
economic and political environment. But the blacks have not
fared as well and generally believe that they have been “displaced from mainstream opportunities by the newly arrived im-
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migrants.” The legal barriers of the segregation era are gone,
but Miami blacks have “remained economically and politically
invisible, especially between riots.“32
The failure of urban policy in the Reagan-Bush era has intensified Miami’s problems, as has been the case elsewhere in
urban America. There is considerable irony, as well, in the fact
that the conservative, right-wing Cubans, who benefited so extensively from government welfare in their early years in the
United States, are adamantly opposed to the kind of social investment that Miami’s black community needs. Each of the riots
since 1980 has produced an outpouring of verbiage on the
necessity for better understanding and improved ethnic relations. But even the city’s Community Relations Board, as one
observer has written, “is a power struggle between blacks and
Hispanics— with the Anglos watching expectantly and playing
as the occasional referee.“33 Miami remains a city on the edge,
an ethnic cauldron that often boils over— no melting pot here.
Questions of racial and ethnic relations will not be easily dissipated in this new immigrant city in what was once the Deep
South.
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